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TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL STATE TENDER OFFER
STATUTE
Sam Wolff*
In The Unconstitutionality of the Arkansas Tender Offer Stat-
ute, 36 Ark. L. Rev. 233 (1983), the author examined the un-
constitutionality of state tender offer statutes in light of Edgar
v. MITE Corp., an important United States Supreme Court
decision in the field of securities regulation. In this Article, the
author posits a theory of limited state tender offer regulation
and asserts that narrowly drawn state tender offer legislation
may survive constitutional attack.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Tender Offer Regulation
The 1980's are the era of the "billion dollar takeover bid," 1 or
"mega-tender" in the parlance of takeover specialists.' In fiscal year
1982, bidders$ commenced 117 tender offers4 for registered target corn-
* Member of the Arkansas Bar. Associate, Wright, Lindsey and Jennings, Little Rock, Ar-
kansas. General Course 1977-1978, The London School of Economics; A.B. 1979, Brown Univer-
sity; J.D. 1982, Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M. (Securities Regulation) 1983, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center. The author thanks Dr. Sally Wolff and Mr. Jeff Berman for
their editorial assistance with this Article.
1. Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Tender Offers Report of
Recommendations 1 (1983) (hereinafter cited as "Advisory Committee Report"), quoting John
S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
2. Participants in the takeover process have developed a parlance, some of the terms of which
- "Golden Parachute" and "White Knight," for example - have appeared in the financial and
popular press. Other terms are more obscure. For example, a "poison pill" is a "class of securities
of the target company convertible upon consummation of any merger or similar transaction into
the common stock of the acquiring entity." Advisory Committee Report, supra note 1, at 141.
"Greenmail" is the "purchase of a substantial block of the subject company's securities by an
unfriendly suitor with the primary purpose of coercing the subject company into repurchasing the
block at a premium over the amount paid by the suitor." Id.
3. The company or individual making the tender offer is called the "bidder" or "offeror."
4. "A tender offer has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made invitation ad-
dressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for sale at a specified price."
Note, The Developing Meaning of 'Tender Offer' Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86
HARV. L. RaV. 1250, 1251 (1973). "The offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group
to buy shares of a company - usually at a price above the current market price. Those accepting
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panies5 in the United States. In fiscal year 1983, bidders commenced
ninety-two tender offers for registered companies in the United States.7
One important factor in the development of the mega-tender offer
is the demise of state tender offer statutes. Virginia enacted the first
state tender offer statute in 1968,8 followed by similar regulation in
thirty-six other states.9 Since state tender offer statutes impeded, and
sometimes even thwarted, tender offers, bidders vigorously attacked the
statutes in both state and federal courts. Bidders contended that the
federal Williams Act 0 preempted the state laws by virtue of the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Bidders also ar-
gued that the state statutes violated the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution by imposing unreasonable burdens upon interstate
commerce.
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Edgar
the offer are said to tender their stock for purchase." H.R. REP. No. 171 i, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811. Regarding the definition of "tender
offer", see generally Proposed SEC Rule 14d-l(b)(l), Exchange Act Release No. 16,385 (Dec. 6,
1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349; Note, Defining Tender Offers: Resolving A Decade of Dilemma, 54
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 520 (1980); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARe. L. REV. 1250 (1973).
5. The corporation whose shares are sought for purchase is called the "target" or "subject"
company.
6. The number of tender offers commenced in 1982 is listed in Advisory Committee Report,
supra note 1, at I I n.9. The figures are for the fiscal year of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, which begins on October I and ends on September 30. The totals only include takeovers
of companies the securities of which are registered under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1934.
See infra note 23.
7. Telephone conversation with staff of Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of
Tender Offers, Washington, D.C. (Jan., 1984).
8. VA. CODE §13.1-528 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
9. See statutes collected in Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State
responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981).
10. The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i), 78m(d)-78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(F) (1976), enacted
by Congress in 1968, established procedural and substantive regulations governing the conduct of
tender offers for large, widely held companies. See infra note 23. The primary emphasis of the
Williams Act is on disclosure by the bidder to the shareholders of the target company and the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("S.E.C." or "Commission"). The bidder must disclose sub-
stantial information concerning matters such as its identity, background, financial situation, pur-
poses and plans. See Schedule 14D.
The Williams Act also establishes a number of so-called "substantive rights" for the protection
of investors. For example, the Williams Act gives a shareholder of the target company who ten-
ders his shares to the bidder the right to withdraw his shares during specified time periods. More-
over, if target shareholders tender more shares than the bidder is willing to purchase ("an over-
subscribed partial offer"), the bidder must prorate its purchases from the tendering shareholders.
Furthermore, a bidder who increases the amount of consideration offered to shareholders during
the tender offer must pay all tendering shareholders the increased consideration, even if some
shares have already been tendered or purchased.
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v. MITE Corp.,11 bidders challenging state takeover laws received in-
consistent results in the courts. Three United States Courts of Appeals
invalidated state statutes, 12 but one appellate court upheld a state
law.13 Many lower courts held state statutes (or certain provisions
thereof) unconstitutional,"' while others sustained state Acts.' 5
11. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
12. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d
486 (7th Cir. 1980), affd sub noma. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub noma. Leroy
v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
13. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980). Telvest did not concern Vir-
ginia's substantive tender offer regulation but rather an amendment to the Virginia takeover stat-
ute which purported to regulate so-called "creeping tender offers." VA. CODE § 13.1-529(b)(iii)
was added in 1979 to the Virginia takeover statute, VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to 13.1-541. The
amendment required purchasers of a certain amount of stock in the open market to comply with
the provisions of the tender offer statute. The district court, in effect, found the amendment un-
constitutional, and granted the plaintiff-purchaser an injunction against enforcement of the
amendment. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the injunction, finding insufficient evidence of
an impermissible conflict with the Williams Act or burden on interstate commerce. Technically,
the Fourth Circuit did not decide that the amendment was constitutional, but rather that the
district court erred in preliminarily enjoining enforcement of the statute against the purchaser.
The court stated that as a matter of policy, "the public interest is as well served by compliance
with a valid State statute as it is by a free securities market." Telvest, 618 F.2d at 1036.
Its preliminary injunction vacated by the Court of Appeals, the District Court conducted a
trial on the merits, and, guided by MITE, held the Virginia amendment unconstitutional under
the commerce clause. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [July-Dec.] 14 SEC. RE. & L. REP. (BNA)
1795 (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 1982). The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [Jan.-
June] 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 157 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1983).
14. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, [1982] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1 98,637 (D.
Mass. Apr. 12, 1982) (state officials preliminarily enjoined from enforcing Massachusetts Act
based on finding of preemption), vacated and remanded, [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,776 (1st Cir. Aug. 16, 1982); Vista Resources, Inc. v. Connolly, [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,627 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 1982); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp
906 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (provisions unconstitutional under supremacy and commerce clauses), affd,
[1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,778 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 1982) (Mo. Takeover Act invalid
under supremacy and commerce clauses); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [July-Dec.]
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 614, at F-I (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981); Empire, Inc. v. Ash-
croft, 524 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Natomas Company v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D.
Nev. 1981); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Canadian Pacific Enterprises
(U.S.), Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Hi-Shear Industries Inc. v. Campbell,
[1981] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1 97,804 (D. S.C. 1980); Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-82]
FED. SEc. L. REp. (CCH) 98,247 (E.D. La. May 3, 1979); Dart Industries, Inc. v. Conrad, 426
F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978); Kelley v. Beta-X Corp., 302 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. 1981); Eure v.
Grand Metropolitan Ltd., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,694 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1980). See
generally Sargent, supra note 9, at 692 n.17. Cf. Gunter v. AGO Intern. B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86
(N.D. Fla. 1981) (Florida Insurance Holding Company Act preempted by the Williams Act).
15. AMCA International Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979); City Invest-
ing Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (alternative holding), affid on alternative
ground 633 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1980); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 613, at F-I (N.H. Sup. Ct. July 2, 1981), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Ins. Comm'r, 102 S.Ct. 3474 (1982), rev'd subnom. Sharon Steel Corp. v.
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In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,16 the Supreme Court of the United
States held the Illinois Business Takeover Act unconstitutional under
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. In part V-B of
the opinion, the Supreme Court juxtaposed the benefits and the bur-
dens of the state law and found a violation of the commerce clause.
"[T]he Illinois Act imposes a substantial burden on interstate com-
merce which outweighs its putative local benefits." ' In part V-A, a
plurality of the Court pointed out that while the commerce clause tol-
erates "incidental" regulation of interstate commerce by the states, it
prohibits "direct" state regulation.18 The plurality argued that the Illi-
nois statute imposed a "direct restraint on interstate commerce" be-
cause it purported to regulate transactions between out-of-state bidders
and non-resident shareholders.19
Since the MITE decision, courts have invalidated virtually every
state tender offer statute which has been challenged.' 0 Many post-
Whaland, -. N.H. _ 466 A.2d 919 (1983); Strode v. Esmark, Inc., [1980] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,538 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1980), rev'd, Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1857 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 1982); Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch.
1980). See generally Sargent, supra note 9, at 692 n.20. Cf. John Alden Life Insurance Company
v. Woods, [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,617 (D. Idaho Dec. 19, 1981) (Idaho Acquisi-
tion of control and Insurance Holding Company Systems Act neither preempted under supremacy
clause nor invalid under commerce clause).
16. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
17. Id. at 645.
18. Id. at 641.
19. Id. For a more extensive discussion of MITE, see Wolff, The Unconstitutionality of the
Arkansas Tender Offer Statute, 36 ARK. L. REV. 223, 238 (1983).
20. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [Jan.-June] 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 157 (4th Cir.
Jan. 6, 1983) ("creeping tender" provision); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., [July-Dec.]
14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1793 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982) (Michigan statute impermissibly
burdens interstate commerce); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., [1982] FED. SEC. L. REp.
(CCH) 98,778 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 1982) (Missouri takeover statute invalid under commerce
clause and certain provisions invalid under supremacy clause); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Ser-
vice Co., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,064 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 21,
1982) (Oklahoma Statute imposed undue burden on interstate commerce), af'd, 715 F.2d 1425
(10th Cir. 1983); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Cities Services Co., [1982-83 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,063 (W.D.Oka. Dec. 20, 1982 (same), affid sub nom. Mesa
Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983); Telvest Inc. v. Bradshaw,
[July-Dec.] 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1795 (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 1982) (Virginia statute
imposed undue burden on interstate commerce); Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 14 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1579 (D. Md. Sept. 3, 1982) (injunction issued against enforcement of
law, on commerce and supremacy clause grounds); Heathcoat v. Sante Fe International Corp.,
No. LR-C-80-601 (E.D. Ark. July 2, 1982); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1857, (Ky. Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 1982) (Kentucky statute found to violate commerce clause);
but see Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, [1982 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,776 (1st Cir.
Aug. 16, 1982) (preliminary injunction against enforcement of Massachusetts statute on grounds
of preemption vacated; case remanded for determination of propriety of relief based on commerce
clause).
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MITE decisions rely upon the supremacy clause as well as the com-
merce clause in striking state statutes.
B. The Future of Tender Offer Regulation
State policy-makers who wish to regulate corporate takeovers af-
fecting companies and people within their state face complicated issues
of constitutional law and economic policy. However, state tender offer
regulation is not inherently unconstitutional." In drafting new legisla-
21. Many courts have opined that the states are not necessarily barred from all takeover
regulation. The Seventh Circuit in Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), for exam-
pie, concluded that all state tender offer regulation was not necessarily unconstitutional, notwith-
standing the patent unconstitutionality of the Illinois Statute:
We do not believe that all state legislation in this field, which imposes requirements
going beyond the Williams Act, is unconstitutional merely because it is different ...
It may very well be possible to draft state takeover legislation to supplement (rather
than to contradict) the Williams Act. . . although the new SEC tender offer rules may
provide crucial constraints, we perceive no inherent reason why the Williams Act may
not be validly complemented ...
633 F.2d at 503. Nor was Justice Stevens, who joined the majority in MITE, persuaded that
"Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutrality in its own legislation is tantamount to a federal
prohibition against state legislation designed to provide special protection for incumbent manage-
ment." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 655 (1982). Accordingly, Justice Stevens did not join
Justice White's preemption analysis. Justice Powell, who also joined the majority, agreed that the
neutrality policy of federal law "does not necessarily imply a congressional intent to prohibit state
legislation designed to assure - at least in some circumstances - greater protection to interests
that include but often are broader than those of incumbent management." Id. at 647. Justice
Powell emphasized his continuing belief in the efficacy of state regulation: "I join Part V-B be-
cause its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender offers." Id.
Justice Powell reasoned that in this period of "conglomerate corporate formations," id., a bidder
may often have an unfair advantage in a takeover battle with a small corporation. When a local
target company loses to a hostile bidder, "[i]nevitably there are certain adverse consequences in
terms of general public interest when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and
state." Id.
In addition, several commentators have expressed opinions that MITE does not necessarily
exclude the states from the takeover arena. For example, Harvey Pitt, former General Counsel of
the SEC, stated that "[s]ince the only consensus reached in MITE was that the Illinois Act, as
drafted, impermissibly imposed an indirect burden on interstate commerce wholly out of propor-
tion to any state interests . . . , the MITE decision by itself does not necessarily serve to invali-
date all state tender offer legislation." Pitt, Hostile Tender Offers Now Omnipresent Fact of Life,
Legal Times, July 19, 1982, at 25, col. 1. "[Harvey Pitt] said the [MITE] decision leaves open
the possibility that states can regulate tender offers involving companies incorporated within their
borders, or where a majority or near majority of shareholders are state residents." Justices Void
Illinois Law on Takeovers, Hurting States' Regulation of Tender Bids, Wall St. J., June 24,
1982, at 3, col. 3. Another former General Counsel of the SEC, Ralph Ferrara, concurred. "'Its a
wide-open ballgame for any State that wants to pass legislation that just protects shareholders
within its own borders.' " Wall St. J., June 24, 1982, at 3, col. 3. Robert Pozen, former Associate
General Counsel of the SEC, opined that "states can revise their general takeover statutes to
comply with applicable constitutional requirements." Pozen, Making State Takeover Statutes
Safe From Constitutional Attack, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 18, col. 1.
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tion, if they choose to do so, state legislatures must focus on the two
principal defects of prior state legislation: conflict with federal law and
extraterritorial application of state law. As documented below, virtually
every current state provision conflicts with, and is therefore preempted
by, federal regulation. Additionally, where a provision of federal regu-
lation benefits shareholders, a similar state provision - which would
benefit shareholders in the absence of federal law - is not deemed
beneficial for purposes of the commerce clause. Therefore, the states
should not, and indeed, may not regulate transactions already subject
to federal regulation. Simply put, the time has come for states to con-
cede defeat in the federal arena.
However, federal law only regulates takeovers of certain large,
widely held companies. Comprehensive as the federal scheme may be
as to these transactions, present law leaves takeovers of smaller, more
closely held companies unregulated. Preemption principles do not pro-
hibit state regulation of non-federally regulated takeovers. State regu-
lation which merely fills the interstices of federal law does not violate
supremacy principles, because there is no federal law with which state
law would conflict. Moreover, states may escape commerce clause ob-
jections by utilizing a restrictive concept of jurisdiction over target
companies. Thus, by regulating only non-federally regulated takeovers,
and utilizing a restrictive concept of jurisdiction over target companies,
as explained below, states may regulate corporate takeovers unscathed
by supremacy or commerce clause attack.
11. THE STATES SHOULD NOT REGULATE TAKEOVERS
ALREADY REGULATED BY FEDERAL LAW
Federal tender offer regulation applies to takeovers of companies
either having total assets of at least three million dollars and a class of
equity securities held by at least five hundred people, or to takeovers of
companies the stock of which is registered on a national securities ex-
change.23 Existing federal regulation is a Congressional and adminis-
On the other hand, some have articulated the view that state tender offer regulation is no
longer viable. Sparks, State Law Developments with Respect to Defensive Techniques, 14 INsT.
ON SEC. REG. 779, 788, 795 (1982). "In the writer's view (with two exceptions), there appears to
be little of substance left for the states to do with respect to the regulation of any important aspect
of tender offers." Id. at 788. "[N]one of the possible bases for invalidating state takeover statutes
was eliminated by MITE . . ." Id.
22. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
23. Sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the Williams Act apply to purchases or offers to purchase
equity securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act (and equity securities
of certain insurance companies and investment companies). Section 12(g) requires registration if
[Vol. 7:83
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trative response to those corporate takeovers perceived by federal pol-
icy-makers to have national economic consequences.
A. The Economics of Tender Offers
Commentators report conflicting evidence concerning the economic
causes and effects of corporate takeovers. Some scholars maintain that
takeovers benefit the nation's economy. The leading proponent of this
theory, Professor Daniel R. Fischel of Northwestern University, argues
that tender offers are beneficial because through this device "corporate
control shifts to new managers who may more successfully operate the
corporation." '24
Fischel maintains that takeover targets tend to be companies
which are not maximizing profits or realizing growth potential, and
that bidder companies can more successfully utilize the assets of the
target - otherwise the bidder would have no reason for the acquisi-
tion.20 "Unless the company is more valuable to the bidder than it is to
the target, the bidder would be acting irrationally in paying a pre-
mium.1 26 The bidder might replace existing managers, spin off unsuc-
cessful divisions, benefit from economies of scale, or better utilize the
target's assets in other ways. 7 Professor Fischel summarizes his view:
I believe that tender offers play an indispensable role in a free market
economy by providing a mechanism for the transfer of assets from
less-efficient to more-efficient users. " ...The bottom line is that so-
ciety benefits from the tender offer process, because assets move to
more valuable users.2 9
Fischel maintains that there is a "market" for control of corporations
and that regulation of tender offers makes the market less "efficient." 30
the issurer has total assets exceeding $1 million and a class of equity securities held by at least
500 persons. However, S.E.C. Regulations permit a company not to register if the company's total
assets are less than $3 million. Rule 12g-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-l (1982). Under section 12(b),
an issuer may register a security on a national securities exchange. Companies with securities
listed on a national stock exchange tend to be large, widely held companies. See infra note 88 for
New York Stock Exchange listing requirements.
24. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1, 45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Efficient
Capital Market Theory].
25. Id.
26. Fischel, McKinney & Goldschmid, The Responsibilities of Directors In Connection With
Unfriendly Tender Offers, 13 INST. ON SEc. REG. 131, 134 (1982).
27. Id. at 133-134.
28. Id. at 132.
29. Id. at 134.
30. Efficient Capital Market Theory, supra note 24.
1984]
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"[L]egal rules should facilitate the making of tender offers at the low-
est possible cost." 81 Tender offer statutes "pose a powerful threat to the
operation of the market for corporate control.132 In MITE, the Su-
preme Court of the United States indicated support for Professor Fis-
chel's theory.33
On the other hand, some analysts maintain that, overall, corporate
takeovers harm the economy. These commentators dispute Fischel's
finding that target companies are generally poorly managed, inefficient
companies. On the contrary, "[iut is the better-run companies that have
been the more attractive targets."" A study undertaken by Martin
Lipton supports the propositions that target companies are frequently
respectable, well-managed companies, and that shareholders are often
in a better position if the takeover bid is defeated.3 5 Another commen-
tator summarized the argument that takeovers generally harm the na-
tional economy:
Allegations have been made that [they] are economically harmful be-
cause takeovers represent a trend towards a concentration of wealth
and power (footnote omitted). Commitment of corporate capital for
takeovers means a loss of opportunity for the creation of new jobs and
increasing productivity (footnote omitted). The lines of credit can be
massive, leaving less funds available for small business which are [sic]
unable to meet the interest requirements (footnote omitted) 6
Another writer expressed his views regarding the deleterious effect on
the national economy: "[a] takeover may result in a loss of indepen-
dence for the target without compensating economies of scale, synergis-
tic value, increased productivity or better technical capability to com-
pete with foreign enterprises.137 Takeovers of target companies are said
31. Fischel, McKinney & Goldschmid, supra note 26.
32. Efficient Capital Market Theory, supra note 24, at 28.
33. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2642 (1982). See also Blue Sky Laws and State
Takeover Statutes: New Importance For An Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 755, n.515 and
accompanying text (1982) [hereinafter cited as Blue Sky Laws]; Jarrell & Bradley, The Eco-
nomic Effects of Federal and State Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 2 J. LAW AND ECONOMICS
371 (1980).
34. McCauloff, Federalism And the Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes, 67 VA. L.
REV. 295, 307 (1981).
35. Lipton, Takeover Bids In the Targets' Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979). See also
Lipton, Takeover Bids In the Targets' Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW
1017 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids In the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Eas-
terbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980); E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, COR-
PORATE POWER (1981).
36. Blue Sky Laws, supra note 33, at 755.
37. McCauloff, supra note 34, at 307.
[Vol. 7:83
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especially to adversely affect local economies:
Takeovers have their broadest effect upon the individual states. The
local impact upon competition and efficiency of the target company,
corporate offices and control, debt-equity structure, and the resultant
effect on management, employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors,
are all state concerns (footnote omitted). Plant closures, consolida-
tions, and relocations will have an impact in the state economy. Ties
with the local supplier of material and work may be cut. State banks
may lose business and customers. Layoffs and employee policy
changes affect community morale and the local tax base."
B. The Need for Federal Regulation
In enacting the Williams Act, Congress weighed the public policy
considerations and chose between competing alternatives. Insofar as the
regulation of tender offers for widely held companies is concerned,
Congress should be the institution making the policy choices. Tender
offers for large, publicly held companies raise far-reaching issues with
macroeconomic implications. Often shareholders are scattered through-
out the United States or the world, and the companies involved often
have a substantial presence in many states. The transactions raise is-
sues concerning concentration of wealth, allocation of resources, and
efficiency and ownership of the means of production. Since state lagis-
latures function to maximize the welfare of the local constituency, Con-
gress is better equipped as an institution to resolve such national issues.
A state legislature responding to adverse local effects of the corporate
takeover process might not, as a political institution, recognize the pos-
sible countervailing benefits in other states. As the Commission puts it:
There has always been a general recognition that certain aspects of
securities regulation - for example, the exchanges and over-the-
counter markets - are of such a uniquely national nature that they
should be subject only to federal law. . . . It is the Commission's
view that the transfer of a controlling interest in the equity securities
of a publicly traded corporation is peculiarly infused with a strong
national interest. When such a transfer is accomplished by means of a
tender offer, . . . the national interest is ordinarily dominant.39
In sum, Congress perceived that tender offers for large companies have
sufficient national economic consequences to warrant federal regula-
38. Blue Sky Laws, supra note 33, at 753.
39. Securities and Exchange Commission Report on Tender Offer Laws 73 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SEC Report].
1984]
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tion. It is unconstitutional for states to tamper with the federal scheme.
C. Present State Takeover Provisions Are Either Unconstitutional
As Applied to Federally Regulated Transactions or Unnecessary
As A Matter Of Policy
The following discussion of state takeover provisions relates only to
those provisions as they apply to companies and transactions already
subject to federal takeover law.
1. Advance Filing Provisions
States simply may not require a bidder to announce its intention to
make a tender offer in advance of commencement,"0 an approach Con-
gress rejected on a number of occasions.41 Federal law requires notifica-
tion only by or on the date of commencement,42 the laws of any state to
the contrary notwithstanding.48
2. Increased Disclosure Provisions
"[The] federal securities laws put a price of disclosure upon access
to the interstate capital markets."" "[T]he Williams Act requires ex-
tensive disclosure of the tender offeror's identity and financial status,
the amount and source of funds for the offer, any plans to alter the
target's organization or operations, potential legal conflicts created by
the offer, and any other facts material to the shareholder's decision
whether to tender his shares."45 In addition to the "line item" disclo-
sures the SEC requires in Schedule 14D-1, federal law makes it unlaw-
ful for the bidder (or other persons) to omit to state any material fact
necessary to make the statements made not misleading in connection
40. E.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion) (pre-commencement
notification provisions frustrates the objectives of the Williams Act); Martin-Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 98,822 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982); National City
Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 98,778 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 1982);
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, [1982] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) § 98,828, 94,246 (S. Ct. Ky. Oct. 12, 1982).
41. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 635-36. "Congress several times refused to im-
pose a precommencement disclosure requirement." Id. "As The Senate Report explained, 'At the
hearings it was urged that this prior review was not necessary and in some cases might delay the
offer when time was of the essence.'" Id., quoting Senate Report at 4.
42. Rule 14d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1982).
43. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
44. In re John Doe Corporation, [1982] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,648 (2d Cir. 1982).




with a tender offer." One might contend that the only "additional"
disclosures a state could require are "immaterial facts." In any event,
in light of the thoroughness of federal disclosure requirements, addi-
tional disclosure required by state law is unlikely to be valuable. And
state disclosure provisions significantly increase the cost of using the
tender offer.47 "Expanded disclosure requirements under state law also
provide target management with increased opportunities to embroil of-
ferors in protracted and expensive litigation that reduces the likelihood
of a tender offer's success."4 8 "[A] state may be doing long-run dam-
age by its [disclosure] requirements that go beyond those of the Wil-
liams Act."49
Even if additional disclosure requirements were desirable as a
matter of policy, the supremacy clause forbids state enactment of them.
Two Courts of Appeals have found increased disclosure requirements
inconsistent with the Williams Act.6 0 The Eighth Circuit in National
City Lines v. LLC Corp.,5 ' for example, found that the Congress and
the Commission made a policy judgment in deciding how much disclos-
ure to require.62 "Missouri's attempt to second-guess that judgment
cannot stand."53
3. Merit Provisions
State provisions which purport to give state officials the authority
to adjudicate the "merit" or fairness of a tender offer for a federally
regulated company are unconstitutional. Courts have consistently found
that fairness provisions either conflict with the philosophy of federal
law," impermissibly burden interstate commerce, or both.
46. Williams Act, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
47. Efficient Capital Market Theory, supra note 24, at 27.
48. Id.
49. Blue Sky Laws, supra note 33, at 755.
50. National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., [1982] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,778 (8th
Cir. 1982); Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nor. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); see also Dart
Industries, Inc. v. Conrad, 426 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D. Ind. 1978); but see AMCA International
Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 936, 938 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
51. [1982] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,778 (8th Cir. 1982).
52. [19821 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,778, at 94,000 (8th Cir. 1982).
53. Id.
54. E.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 640 (plurality opinion); MITE Corp. v. Dixon,




Hearings which delay or otherwise impede tender offers conflict
with. the Williams Act" and burden interstate commerce, irrespective
of their purpose. Even if no delay is involved, a hearing may not be
held to adjudicate substantive fairness.
5. Take-down Provisions
Some states have enacted provisions which permit a tender offer to
commence pursuant to SEC Rule 14d-2(b) but which do not allow the
bidder to purchase or "take-down" the tendered shares until a hearing
has been held." "New York, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and the drafters of
the Proposed Uniform Takeover Act have . . . taken the same basic
approach: the tender offer may be made in conformity with Rule 14d-
2(b), but actual purchase of the tendered shares is conditioned upon
completion of the state review process." ' In this statutory scheme, the
state reviews the adequacy of disclosure before permitting the take-
down.
While take-down provisions do not directly conflict with federal
law (i.e., Rule 14d-2(b)), they probably violate "indirect" preemption
rules of the supremacy clause. The statute under consideration by the
Eighth Circuit in National City Lines v. LLC Corp. "upset the con-
gressionally designed balance by creating delay in the commencement
and consummation of the tender offer."58 Take-down provisions operate
to prevent bidders from purchasing shares from willing sellers. The de-
lay, if long enough, could trigger federal withdrawal rights of the
shareholders and thereby thwart the objectives of the Williams Act.
The provisions could also delay or prevent an out-of-state bidder from
assuming control of and operating a local company, a significant bur-
den upon interstate commerce.
6. Withdrawal Provisions
Federal law gives shareholders the right to withdraw tendered
shares within fifteen business days" or after sixty calendar days6" from
55. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 639 (plurality opinion); National City Lines, Inc. v.
LLC Corp., [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,778 (8th Cir. 1982).
56. See Sargent, supra note 9, at 708-12.
57. Id. at 709-10.
58. [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,778, 93,999 (8th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
59. Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1982).
60. Williams Act, § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(d)(5) (1976).
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the date of commencement of the tender offer. State provisions some-
times purport to extend shareholder withdrawal rights. For example,
the Delaware statute authorized shareholders to withdraw tendered
stock any time during the pendency of the offer.6 ' Even though the
extended withdrawal privileges undoubtedly aid investors in some
ways,6" the provisions are preempted by federal law63 because they
"create delays which give incumbent management additional time for
defensive maneuvers."'" Additional withdrawal rights both "directly
conflict with applicable federal statutes and regulations" 66 and "[frus-
trate] the operation and purpose of the Williams Act."66
7. Prorata Purchase Provisions
The Williams Act provides that bidders must prorate their
purchases of shares tendered within ten days of either commencement
of a tender offer or notice of an increased price given during a tender
offer. 67 This short proration period resulted in several abuses. For ex-
ample, the rule forced shareholders to tender within ten days in partial
offers, or risk having none of their stock purchased. Also, bidders devel-
oped the so-called "two-tier offer," in which they offered cash to share-
holders tendering "up front" in the proration period and stock or debt
"paper" (debt) to shareholders deciding to sell later. Some states en-
acted longer proration periods, the constitutionality of which was very
much in doubt.68 Policy arguments supporting state proration periods
are now moot, because the SEC recently promulgated a rule extending
the proration requirement in oversubscribed partial offers to the entire
61. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1980).
62. "[T]he state interests behind these substantive provisions are clearly investor protection."
Blue Sky Laws, supra note 33, at 752. "The unsophisticated investor who tenders early would be
protected by the extended time periods of withdrawal." Id. The burdens imposed on the tender
offeror appear slight in comparison. Id.
63. National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,778,
94,001 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri withdrawal provisions preempted); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith,
507 F. Supp. 1206, 1221-22, (D. N.J. 1981) (New Jersey withdrawal provision preempted); Dart
Industries, Inc. v. Conrad, 426 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D. Ind. 1978). But see Wylain, Inc. v. TRE
Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch. 1979, rev. 1980) (no preemption).
64. See Sargent, supra note 9, at 699.
65. National City Lines v. LLC Corp., [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 94,001.
66. Id.
67. Williams Act, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(d)(6) (1976).
68. See, e.g., National City Lines v. LLC Corp., supra note 14, at 1 94,001 (Missouri provi-
sion requiring pro rata purchase of shares deposited anytime during the period of the offer pre-
empted); Hi-Shear Industries, Inc. v. Campbell, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804,
90,031 (D.S.C. 1980) (South Carolina proration period preempted).
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period of the offer.6
8. "Creeping Tender" Provisions
"Partly to evade disclosure laws, bidders have turned increasingly
to open market and privately negotiated purchases to secure a foothold
in a target's stock before launching a formal tender offer."' 70 Tender
offers preceded by substantial market or private purchases are called
"creeping tender offers" or "creeping acquisitions," because the acqui-
sition proceeds slowly and almost imperceptibly. "The creeping acquisi-
tion involves the relatively gradual accumulation of target stock at or
near market .... ,,71 The prior accumulation is thought to make the
subsequent tender offer easier or cheaper to consummate. State regula-
tion of creeping tender offers is one of the most controversial aspects of
state securities regulation.
In section 13(d) of the Williams Act, Congress addressed the pol-
icy problems it perceived associated with accumulations of stock by
means other than a tender offer. '2 Many authorities believe that section
13(d) does not adequately protect shareholders of companies subject to
creeping tender offers.73 There is little question that new legislation is
69. See Release on Revised Rule Limiting Two-Stage Tender Offers Issued By SEC, [Jan.-
June] 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 4 (Jan. 7, 1983) (discussing SEC Rel. No. 34,19336) and
Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984).
70. Developments in Corporate Takeover Techniques: Creeping Tender Offers, Lockup Ar-
rangements, and Standstill Agreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095 (1982).
71. Atkins, Defense Against Creeping Tenders, 13 INST. ON SEG. REG. 58 (1982).
72. The Williams Act, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976), requires any person acquiring
more than five percent of the equity securities of certain companies to disclose material facts
within 10 days.
73. The principal problem is that a potential bidder may acquire a large position in a com-
pany without disclosing its intentions with respect to the company for 10 days. The bidder's inten-
tion to make a subsequent tender offer or otherwise seek to acquire control is clearly material to
shareholders who are confronted with investment decisions during the 10 day pre-filing period.
Bidder purchases in the interim period may "deprive security holders of a fair opportunity to
adjust their evaluation of the securities . . . " SEC Report, supra note 39, at 55. That is,
purchases in this period "deprive shareholders of the premium they would otherwise receive if they
were aware of the impending takeover." Developments in Corporate Takeover Techniques: Creep-
ing Tender Offers, Lockup Arrangements, and Standstill Agreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1095, 1102 (1982). Also, a program of open market purchases often drives the market price of the
stock up, which "exert[s] pressure on investors similar to that applied by tender offers." Glenn,
Rethinking the Regulation of Open Market and Privately Negotiated Stock Transactions Under
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 8 J. CORP. L. 41, 55 (1982). "A review of the present
operation of Section 13(d) indicates that the existing notification system often does not provide
shareholders with relevant information in a timely manner and a fair opportunity to evaluate the
company when an acquisition of a potentially controlling interest in the company has been ef-
fected." SEC Report, supra note 39. See also Atkins, Defense Against Creeping Tenders, 13 INsT.
ON SEc. REG. 58 (1982) (creeping tenders deny control premiums to shareholders).
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needed to correct problems inadequately addressed by the Williams
Act.7 ' Although arguably, then, there is room for state regulation in
this area as a policy matter, the Constitution seemingly precludes such
state involvement. Even the Tender Offer Committee of the North
American Securities Administrators Association recommends state ab-
stention: "It is suggested by the Committee that the issue of creeping
tender offers is best regulated in the federal arena. ' 6
The Fourth Circuit in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw,7 6 sustained a
commerce clause challenge to state open market regulation on the
ground that the statute violated V-B of MITE. Since the creeping
tender provision at issue was not limited to transactions between Vir-
ginia residents, the statute on its face had an extraterritorial effect,
which burdened interstate commerce.77 Secondly, prohibiting the bid-
der's open market purchases in the specified circumstances could cause
the market price of the target's stock to fall, thereby denying "both
resident and nonresident shareholders an opportunity to sell their [tar-
get] stock at a premium. 7 8 Against these burdens upon interstate com-
merce the Court balanced the asserted benefit of the law, namely, dis-
closure by the purchaser. But since section 13(d) of the Williams Act
already requires disclosure, the benefit of additional disclosure was
speculative, according to the court.7 9 "We think that the Williams Act
provides all of the protection to an investor that the Virginia Act is
claimed to afford."S0 The states may encounter another commerce
clause objection in any regulation of open market purchases they at-
tempt. State legislation which purports to prevent a willing buyer from
purchasing stock from a willing seller on a national stock exchange (or
even on a regional exchange, or over-the-counter) might even contra-
vene V-A of MITE. "[T]o the extent states seek to assert the authority
to preclude open market purchases on national stock exchanges, they
may appear to be regulating interstate commerce transactions di-
rectly. ... " The Fourth Circuit in Telvest explicitly did not reach
74. In fact, the SEC proposed new legislation to Congress in 1980 which would have altered
the existing scheme of open-market regulation, but Congress rejected the proposals. See SEC
Report, supra note 39, at 84-86.
75. Report of the Tender Offer Committee of the North American Securities Administrators
Association, Inc., [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 626, at G-I (Oct. 28, 1981).
76. [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,044 (4th Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 94,970.
78. Id. at 1 94,971.
79. Id. at 1 94,972.
80. Id. at 1 94,972.
81. Pitt, Hostile Tender Offers Now Omnipresent Fact of Life, Legal Times, July 19, 1982,
at 26, col. 2. [hereinafter cited as Hostile Tender Offers].
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the V-A issue, although the district court in Telvest grounded its deci-
sion on V-A as well as V-B. 2
The supremacy clause also poses formidable, if not insurmounta-
ble, obstacles to states which desire to regulate creeping tenders. Con-
gress addressed open market purchases in the Williams Act and despite
the shortcomings of federal regulation, a differing state regulation
would be highly susceptible to a preemption challenge. "Congress spe-
cifically enacted Section 13(d) in a less burdensome form than Section
14(d) so as not to unduly interfere with the free and open auction mar-
ket in securities. 8 If a state statute sought to regulate open market
purchases, "a cogent argument could be made that the resultant inter-
ference with normal market procedure would be preempted by the Wil-
liams Act. . . 8 While two Courts of Appeals opinions support the
proposition that the Williams Act does not necessarily preempt state
creeping tender regulation, the opinions are not considered dispositive.85
9. Antifraud Provisions
Many state takeover statutes prohibit fraudulent and deceptive
practices in connection with tender offers. In light of federal antifraud
proscriptions, however, state regulation of tender offer fraud is largely
unnecessary. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act makes it unlawful for
any person to make any false or misleading statement or omission, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative action, in connec-
82. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [1982] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,833 (E.D. Va. 1982).
83. City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 633 F.2d 56, 62 (7th Cir. 1980).
84. Id.
85. The initial Fourth Circuit opinion in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir.
1980), found insufficient evidence of an impermissible conflict with the Williams Act to sustain an
injunction against enforcement of the law. As mentioned above, supra note 13, however, the Court
did not directly pass upon the constitutionality of the law, but rather found that the court below
misapplied the preliminary injunction standard.
In Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, [19821 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,776, (1st Cir.
1982), the First Circuit, like the Fourth Circuit in Telvest, vacated the preliminary injunction of
the district court. The statute involved in Agency barred a five percent shareholder from making a
tender offer if, within the preceding twelve months, he purchased any shares without disclosing his
takeover intention, if it existed. In Agency, "[t]he validity of [the statute's] regulation of creeping
tender offers [was] not in itself attacked," id. at 1 93,946; rather, the one-year sanction was ar-
gued to be preempted. Although the Court found insufficient evidence to sustain an injunction
based on preemption, "[i]t should be emphasized that Agency did not challenge the validity of the
regulation of creeping tender offers" per se (but rather, the one-year sanction). Sparks, State Law
Developments With Respect to Defensive Techniques, 14 INST. ON SEC. REG. 779, 799 (1982).
"Hence, the First Circuit was not called upon to address the fundamental question raised by the
cases. . . . This, together with the First Circuit's suggestion that a Commerce Clause challenge
under MITE is likely to be successful, probably makes the opinion much less significant than it
appears on a quick reading." Id. at 799.
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tion with a tender offer. 81 Significantly, the federal rule is not limited
to fraud occurring in transactions for Section 12 companies, but rather
proscribes all fraud in connection with any tender offer. Consequently,
state antifraud provisions serve little purpose.
In Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., the Sixth Circuit held
that the antifraud provisions of the Michigan takeover statute could not
constitutionally be enforced with an injunction granted to state officials:
We find that to the extent that the state statutes confer power on
state authorities to interfere with the timing of an interstate tender
offer made under the Williams Act, or to compel the revision of the
solicitation or tender offer as a condition of proceeding, they impose
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.97
In sum, with the possible exception regarding areas of traditional
state regulation" states should refrain from regulating takeovers con-
trolled by federal takeover law.
III. STATES MAY REGULATE NON-FEDERALLY
REGULATED TAKEOVERS OF COMPANIES WITH
SUBSTANTIAL PERCENTAGES OF RESIDENT
SHAREHOLDERS
As noted above, federal tender offer regulation applies only to
companies with total assets of at least three million dollars and a class
of equity securities held by at least five hundred persons, or companies
the stock of which is registered on a national securities exchange. Com-
panies which have securities registered on a national exchange are
large, widely held companies. 80 Takeovers of smaller, more closely held
companies are unregulated by federal tender offer law. Apparently,
federal regulators concluded that takeovers of these smaller companies
did not have sufficient national consequences to justify federal involve-
ment. While empirical research is necessary to determine the frequency
and characteristics of takeovers of smaller, more closely held compa-
86. Williams Act, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
87. (1982] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1 98,822, 94,218 (6th Cir. 1982). The court reserved
the question whether a state could enact an antifraud provision and enforce it with a damage
action. "[W]e find it unnecessary at this time to address the question of the viability of a provision
assessing damages for non-compliance with the substantive anti-fraud provisions of the Act." Id.
88. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
89. Following are the listing requirements for the New York Exchange: (a) pretax income
last year: $2,500,000; (b) pretax income last two years: $2,000,000; (c) net tangible assets:
$16,000,000; (d) shares publicly held: 1,000,000; (e) market value publicly held shares, minimum:
$8,000,000; (f) number of round lot holders: 2,000. See N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) I 2495(B).
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nies, state regulation of non-federally regulated tender offers may serve
a useful function in protecting shareholders.
Several courts and commentators have stated that regulation of
non-federally regulated takeovers may be constitutional. The Court in
Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., for example, invalidated the Michigan statute
only insofar as it applied to federally regulated companies: "[tlhe state
provisions remain valid . . . as to those corporations not included in the
Federal regulatory scheme."90 Harvey Pitt opined:
[T]he MITE decision would not appear necessarily to preclude the
states from regulating tender offers for local companies closely identi-
fied with one state. . . .Similarly, the states may have close ties to
other publicly held companies not subject to the Williams Act ...
The difficulty with the states asserting tender offer jurisdiction over
such companies is not with the concept; in fact, the SEC previously
has endorsed state regulation of companies not subject to the Wil-
liams Act.91
This new state legislation must, of course, satisfy the commerce clause
and the supremacy clause.
A. The Commerce Clause: Herein of the Distinction Between V-A
and V-B
Had Part V-A of the MITE commanded a majority of the Su-
preme Court, the states would be much more limited in their ability to
regulate corporate tender offers. In Part V-A, the plurality found that
90. 302 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
91. Hostile Tender Offers, supra note 81. Mr. Pitt cited the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's amicus curiae brief in Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979),
regarding the SEC endorsement. "[T]he Commission stated that it [did] not dispute that, to the
extent that states supplement the federal securities laws by filling in the interstices in federal law,
no objection should properly be raised.'" Id., quoting SEC brief in Kidwell at 51; "The Commis-
sion's brief then noted that, under appropriate circumstances, states properly could regulate, inter
alia, tender offers for non-public companies; that are wholly intrastate in nature; and for Securi-
ties Exchange Act Section 15(d) companies that are not covered by the Williams Act." Id. at 34
n. 88, summarizing SEC brief in Kidwell, note 154.
See also Sparks, State Law Developments With Respect to Defensive Techniques, 14 INST. ON
SEC. REG. 779, 790 (1982). Several states have, in fact, enacted new legislation regulating take-
over offers. See Legislative Brief, [Jan.-June] 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 873 (May 18,
1984) (new Wisconsin law); Legislative Briefs [Jan.-June] 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 88
(Jan. 13, 1984) (new Pennsylvania law); 1982 OHIO LEGIS. SEaRV. §§ 5-395, 5-402 (Balwin) (new
Ohio law); Wisconsin Senate Unanimously Passes Revised Corporate Takeover Statute, [Jan.-
June] 16 Sac. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 27.6 (Feb. 17, 1984) (discussing new Wisconsin, Ohio and
Maryland statutes); Legislative Briefs, [Jan.-June] 16 SEc. RE. & L. REP. (BNA) 814 (May
11, 1984) (new Michigan Senate Bill).
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the Illinois takeover statute imposed a "direct restraint" on interstate
commerce. 90 According to the plurality, the statute directly regulated
interstate commerce because it could apply to transactions between for-
eign corporate bidders and non-resident shareholders of target
companies.
A Supreme Court holding premised upon part V-A would have
limited state regulation to intrastate transactions, even if the takeover
in question was not subject to federal regulation. While lower courts
are, of course, free to employ a V-A analysis,93 MITE indicates that so
long as the statute bears a reasonable relation to the state, its constitu-
tionality should be adjudged in accordance with V-B. If states adopt a
restrictive concept of jurisdiction over target companies the new legisla-
tion should be viewed by courts as having an "incidental," rather than
"direct," effect upon interstate commerce.
V-B, grounded, as it is, in the burden-benefit analysis of the com-
merce clause, permits the states to reformulate their approach to take-
over regulation. The new legislation must completely alter the balance
of the former legislation. In the new scheme, the benefits of the legisla-
tion will be high, since the provisions will not duplicate existing federal
protections. The burdens on interstate commerce are of two general
types. First, each specific provision burdens interstate commerce in
some way; for example, a state provision which requires a bidder to
prorate its purchases burdens interstate commerce to the extent the
bidder would otherwise not prorate. However, the typical regulatory
provision, per se, is generally not considered overly burdensome. The
second, "most obvious,""4 burden on interstate commerce is, as men-
tioned, extraterritorial application of state law. To bring their statutes
into compliance with the Constitution, this is the burden which the
states must address.
In 1980, the SEC submitted to Congress a number of proposed
amendments to the Williams Act.91 The Commission recommended
that Congress explicitly preempt all state takeover regulation except
that which is "truly local in character."" Even the Securities and Ex-
change Commission recognized that "[w]here the subject company is
92. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 640.
93. Even though V-A was not adopted by the majority, states should still heed the V-A
precedents. A state statute which purported to regulate interstate transactions bearing absolutely
no relation to the state might still be found to constitute an impermissible "direct regulation,"
notwithstanding the lack of majority support for V-A.
94. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 641.
95. See SEC Report, supra note 39.
96. Id. at 124.
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local in character, one state may have a sufficient interest to justify its
exercise of some regulatory jurisdiction. 97 So the Commission pro-
posed for Congress expressly to preempt all state takeover statutes, ex-
cept those applicable to a company which (1) has its principal place of
business in that state, and (2) has more than fifty percent of its benefi-
cial owners, who in the aggregate hold more than fifty percent of the
stock of the company, residing in the state.98 "Such a company and its
shareholders are so predominantly local in character as to warrant the
exercise of some measure of control by the state."99
The Commission's 1980 proposal should be reevaluated in light of
MITE. The takeover jurisdiction of a state should be restricted to tar-
get companies with at least sixty-six and two-thirds percent of their
shareholders residing in that state. In light of MITE, the principal
place of business test should be stricken as irrelevant, since the recog-
nized objective of tender offer regulation is investor protection. The
sixty-six and two-thirds percentage, necessarily arbitrary, represents an
estimate of the extent of extraterritoriality the commerce clause will
bear. Of course, this extent will vary according to both the other bur-
dens imposed on interstate commerce by specific provisions and the
benefits afforded residents by the law. For example, even if one hun-
dred percent of the shareholders were state residents, a state could not
enact a law which had the effect of actually prohibiting an out-of-state
bidder from making a tender offer for the company - the burden on
interstate commerce would be too great. The benefits, which will be
high due to the absence of corresponding federal benefits, must still be
judged only in relation to the residents, since a state has no interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders. But the crux of the matter is this:
as a consequence of the distinction between V-A and V-B, the com-
merce clause does not require in-state residence of one-hundred percent
of the equity-holders, if the benefits are significant in relation to both
that burden of the extraterritoriality which does exist, and other bur-
dens imposed by specific provisions. It is submitted that the extraterri-
toriality which does exist under the above proposal would be out-
weighed by benefits to resident shareholders, assuming the statute did
not unreasonably burden interstate commerce in other ways.
97. Id. at 73.
98. Id. at 98.
99. Id. at 78.
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B. The Supremacy Clause
The supremacy clause poses no problems for states desiring to reg-
ulate below the federal threshold. As one commentator noted, "[t]he
Williams Act clearly does not preempt the application of state anti-
takeover laws to companies too small to be registered under the 1934
Act. Such companies are exempt from Williams Act coverage."' 10
The notion that the supremacy clause does not prohibit state regu-
lation of non-federally regulated companies arises from traditional pre-
emption analysis. Supremacy clause objections to state statutes are of
three general types.1 °  First, it could be argued that Congress "occu-
pied the entire field" of tender offer regulation, leaving states abso-
lutely no room to act, even in areas where Congress was silent. How-
ever, "[ift is clear that [this] broadest preemption argument - that
Congress intended that the Williams Act should 'occupy the entire
field' of takeover regulation - is not available,"'' because the legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress did not intend completely to elimi-
nate the state's role in the area. Secondly, a "direct" conflict between
federal and state law, which renders compliance with both regulatory
schemes impossible, preempts a state provision.' 03 But if state regula-
tion remains below the federal threshold, there is no federal law with
which state law would conflict.
A third theory of preemption is designated "'indirect conflict' pre-
emption:" an impermissible conflict is found where the state "law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."'" Certainly, state regulation
which extends investor protections to shareholders of smaller companies
does not contravene Congressional objectives, where investor protection
is the goal of federal law. Preemption of state regulation which falls
below the federal threshold would require a finding that Congress man-
dated smaller takeovers to be unregulated - which clearly was not the
case. Rather, Congress undoubtedly considered that only the larger
100. Sparks, State Law Developments With Respect to Defensive Techniques, 14 INST. ON
SEC. REG. 777, 790 (1982).
101. Id. at 780.
102. Id.; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 639; Rent-A-Car v. Connolly, [1982]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,776, 93,945 (1st Cir. 1982) (argument that Congress intended to
occupy entire field not likely to be successful); Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State
Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 519-20 (1979); Note, Preemption and the
Constitutionality of State Tender Offer Legislation, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 725, 731 (1979).
103. E.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
104. Edgar Corp. v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 631 (plurality opinion) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
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transactions were of sufficient national importance to warrant federal
regulation.
The states should consider regulating all takeovers otherwise sub-
ject to their jurisdiction by virtue of the above shareholder residence
rules if the company has fifty or more shareholders. While admittedly
this number is arbitrary and the matter is particularly suited for legis-
lative determination, the financial stakes of fifty or more shareholders
are probably sufficiently important to justify the imposition of state
protections.
C. The Form of Regulation
1. Jurisdiction
To summarize, a particular state's statute should apply only to a
takeover attempt of a target company:
(a) that has at least sixty-six and two-thirds percent of its sharehold-
ers resident in the state; and
(b) that has at least fifty shareholders: Provided, the Act will not ap-
ply if the Williams Act applies to the transaction.
2. Provisions States May Not or Should Not Enact
a. Advance Filing Provisions
A state statute requiring an out-of-state bidder to file a registra-
tion statement with a state commission prior to the commencement of a
tender offer would probably violate the commerce clause, even where a
restrictive concept of state jurisdiction over target companies is em-
ployed, and even where the Williams Act is inapplicable. Advance
filing provisions impose a tremendous burden on interstate commerce
because they give substantial advantages to target companies. Since
time is of the quintessance in tender offers, and delay inherently re-
dounds to the benefit of the target company, states should avoid ad-
vance filing provisions.
b. Merit Provisions
As to companies subject to the Williams Act, Congress made a
policy decision with which states may not tamper: the fairness of the
transaction is not a regulatory concern. Where the Williams Act is in-
applicable, it would not violate the supremacy clause for the state to
adjudicate the merit of a tender offer. However, the burden on inter-
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state commerce of these provisions would be tremendous: merit provi-
sions would completely halt the progress of interstate tender offers. Al-
though there are some policy arguments in favor of merit
determinations, 0 5 and some blue-sky laws do allow states to adjudicate
the merit of public offerings of securities within the state, merit provi-
sions involving interstate tender offers are probably unconstitutional -
even where extraterritoriality is minimized, and the Williams Act is
inapplicable.
c. Hearing Provisions
Assuming no state enactment of merit provisions, the only purpose
of a hearing would be to adjudicate the adequacy of disclosure. Pre-
commencement disclosure hearings would delay the tender offer process
and thus would impermissibly burden interstate commerce. Post-com-
mencement, pre-consummation hearings (i.e., take-down provisions)
are probably unconstitutional as well. The better course is simply to
make inadequate disclosure a civil wrong with a private right of action
for damages and rescission.
3. Provisions States Should Adopt
a. Tender Offer Disclosure
When a bidder makes a tender offer for a local target company
that has a class of equity securities held by at least fifty shareholders,
the state should require the bidder to file a disclosure document with
the state securities commission as soon as practicable on the date of
commencement and send the statement to the shareholders. The docu-
ment should resemble the SEC Schedule 14D, although increased dis-
closure provisions would not necessarily be unconstitutional as applied
to these companies.
b. Withdrawal
Investors should be given withdrawal rights similar to those pro-
vided by Section 14(d)(5) of the Williams Act and SEC Rule 14d-7.
c. Proration
The states should enact proration rules similar to Section 14(d)(6)
105. The central argument in favor of the merit standard is that under the present system, if




and SEC Rule 14d-8.
d. Minimum Offering Period
The new legislation should require a minimum offering period
analogous to that required by SEC Rule 14e-1.
e. Antifraud
The states could duplicate the antifraud proscription of Section
14(e). Additionally, state legislation could prohibit fraud in connection
with "takeovers," "creeping acquisitions," and "attempted takeovers,"
since the tendency of some courts to require an extant tender offer
under Section 14(e) has led to a number of unremedied abuses. The
legislation should make fraud a civil wrong, with a private right of ac-
tion for damages and rescission.
f. Insider Trading
The states should proscribe transactions in the target's securities
on the basis of material, nonpublic information in a manner analogous
to SEC Rule 14e-3.
4. Provisions States Should Consider
a. Creeping Tender Regulation
States should consider regulating creeping acquisitions of non-fed-
erally regulated companies subject to their jurisdiction. At a minimum,
the states could enact a provision similar to current Section 13(d). As
an alternative, states could consider legislation analogous to that pro-
posed to Congress by the SEC in 1980.0 6 Under that proposal, an ac-
quirer of more than five percent of a class of equity securities would be
required to announce publicly the acquisition and his purpose no later
than one business day after the purchase. 10 The purchaser would not
only be required to file with the SEC within five business days after the
purchase and send the issuer more extensive disclosures,"0 8 but also:
The proposed section 13(d) would prohibit further stock purchases
from the time the five percent threshold was passed until two days
106. SEC Report, supra note 39, at 84-86.
107. Glenn, Rethinking the Regulation of Open Market and Privately Negotiated Stock
Transactions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 8 J. CORP. L. 41, 55 (1982) (summa-
rizing the SEC proposal).
108. Id.
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after the required statement was filed with the SEC (footnote omit-
ted). . . .This regulation of open market and privately negotiated
purchases has no precedent in section 13(d) as presently written.1 "
The state creeping tender regulation would apply to non-federally
regulated companies, so the legislation would not be preempted by Sec-
tion 13(d). It must be noted, however, that the provision might be vul-
nerable to a V-A challenge to the extent the regulation is applied to
purchases by an out-of-state buyer on a national stock exchange. A V-
B objection could also be expected, and might prove dispositive, be-
cause interference with open-market purchases is a substantial burden
on interstate commerce, even when extraterritoriality is minimized.
b. Regulation of Risk Arbitrage
The term "arbitrage" comprises "classical" arbitrage and "risk"
arbitrage.110 "Risk" arbitrage involves the privately negotiated or open
109. The text of the proposal provided as follows:
(3) Every person, other than the issuer thereof. . . who, as a result of the .. acquisi-
tion of the beneficial ownership of any security of a class .. .becomes the beneficial
owner, in the aggregate, of more than 5 percent of the class, shall:
(A) as soon as practicable, but in no event later than one business day after such
acquisition, make a public announcement, which shall be limited to disclosure of his
identity, the amount of securities of the class beneficially owned by him, the identity
of the issuer of that class and a brief description of the purpose of such acquisition;
(B) within five business days after the date of such acquisition, file with the Com-
mission and send a statement... ;
(C) not acquire, . . . any additional securities of the class, otherwise than pursuant
to a "statutory offer" as defined in section 14(d)(l)(B) of this title, from the time of
such acquisition until the expiration of two business days from the date of filing of
the statement ...
(4) Any person who, .... is the beneficial owner of more than 5 percent of a class of
securities. . . other than either the issuer thereof. . . shall file within the Commission
and send a statement . . . within 10 business days of achieving such status, or within
whatever other period the Commission may prescribe by rule or regulation. ...
(5) If a material change occurs in the information set forth in a statement filed pursu-
ant to paragraphs (3) or (4) of this subsection, the person filing such statement shall:
(A) within five business days or such shorter or longer period as the Commission
may prescribe . . . , file with the Commission and send an amendment to such
statement, . . . disclosing such material change; and
(B) not acquire, . . . any additional securities of the class . . . from the time such
material change occurs until the expiration of two business days from the date of
filing of the amendment, or such shorter period as the Commission may prescribe by
rule or regulation ... "
110. Aranow and Einhorn explain the traditional meaning of "arbitrage":
Arbitrage may be broadly defined as the purchase of property in one market and the
simultaneous or near simultaneous sale of the same property, or its equivalent, in either
the same or a different market for the purpose of generating a profit resulting from the
differential in price for such property or its equivalent.
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market purchase of a target company's securities during a tender of-
fer."' The risk arbitrageur hopes subsequently to tender the securities
he purchased to the bidder, thereby profiting on the differential be-
tween his purchase price and the tender price.1 As the SEC explains:
The term 'risk arbitrage' is itself a misnomer in that the transactions
to which it is generally applied to do not involve arbitrage in the clas-
sic sense of an effort to 'lock in' a profit resulting from an existing
spread, or differential, between the prices of the same security in dif-
ferent markets or by one security and a second security convertible
into the first. Rather, risk arbitrage involves a risking of capital on a
contingent event.118
Risk arbitrageurs are not specifically regulated by federal law -
to the detriment of the investing public, according to at least one com-
mentator. 1 4 A strong case has been made that the activity of arbi-
trageurs not only upsets the efficiency of the securities markets,115 but
also "creates an intense pressure on investors to sell into the market
without regard for the underlying merits of the tender offer." '  It is
imperative, one commentator concluded, that tender offer arbitrage be
regulated.
In 1980, the SEC proposed that Congress amend the Williams Act
by adding a new Section 14(0. The amendment would have given the
SEC rulemaking authority over risk arbitrage "including authority to
require persons engaged in such activity to provide the Commission
with post-acquisition information about their actions." 1  The legisla-
tion would also have given the Commission authority to promulgate
substantive rules to govern risk arbitrage,118 but Congress never
B. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 174 (1973). Regarding
arbitrage, see generally M. EVANS, ARBITRAGE IN DOMESTIC SECURITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1965); Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 466 (1971);
Wyser-Pratte, Risk Arbitrage, BULL., May, 1971, (N.Y.U. C.J. Devine Institute of Finance);
Comment, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage Be Regulated?, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1000 (1978) [herein-
after cited as Arbitrage]; Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. L. 1315 (1977); Arbitrage: It's The Hottest
Game In Town, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 17, 1977, at 71.
111. SEC Release No. 18050 (Aug. 21, 1981).
112. Id.
113. SEC Release No. 15533 (Jan. 29, 1979). The use of the term "arbitrage" to describe
the above activity in tender offers may derive from the fact that the practice "involves differing
prices for the same security in what may be viewed as two markets, the current market price and
the contingent parity value if the risk arbitrage event is consummated. Id.
114. See Arbitrage, supra note 110, at 1000.
115. Id. at 1023.
116. Id. at 1027.
117. SEC Report, supra note 39, at 118.




The commentator cited above recommends a forceful approach to
the regulation of tender offer arbitrage and rejects disclosure as ineffi-
cacious: "There is nothing of substance for the arbitrageur to dis-
close. .. -."' Rather, "the most effective mode of regulation ...
would consist of imposing across-the-board volume limitations upon
purchases of target shares during the pendency of the tender offer."120
In any event, if a state legislature concludes that, as a policy mat-
ter, arbitrageurs present in the state should be regulated, state legisla-
tion would not necessarily be unconstitutional. The supremacy clause is
not at issue because of the absence of pertinent federal regulation. And
commerce clause objections could be defeated if the state enacted lim-
ited, reasonable legislation analogous to state regulation of broker-deal-
ers. For example, a state might provide that any person employed
within the state who engages in a risk arbitrage transaction register
with the state securities commission. The state could require an arbi-
trageur to file a disclosure statement with a state official a certain num-
ber of days after the arbitrage transaction. The disclosure, in turn,
could be studied by the state in an effort to identify abuses which occur
in the arbitrage process.
As a constitutional matter, then, the states may regulate non-fed-
erally regulated takeover bids for target companies with a large per-
centage of resident shareholders. Whether a state embarks upon this
course will depend upon the frequency and characteristics of such take-
overs in a particular state.
IV. STATE REGULATION OF FEDERALLY REGULATED
TAKEOVERS OF COMPANIES TRADITIONALLY SUBJECT
TO STATE REGULATION
It may be desirable, as a matter of policy, for states to regulate
changes of control in special industries, as the states have regulated
certain industries for many years. "[T]here is a long history of judicial
and congressional acceptance of state regulation of. . .banking, insur-
The Commission may, by rule, require persons engaged in arbitrage activity in connec-
tion with any offer or acquisition subject to Sections 13(d) or 14(d) of this title to
provide it with such information about their activities, and to act in accordance with
such standards, as the Commission deems necessary in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id. at 96.




ance, and utility business."121 Whether present state statutes regulating
these special industries are constitutional is a matter of considerable
controversy.12 2 However, many commentators believe that new, care-
fully drafted statutes will be able to survive constitutional scrutiny.1 23
The banking, insurance, and utility industries are said to deserve spe-
cial treatment because the local interest is significantly greater. Most
bank depositors, for example, reside within the state in which the bank
is chartered.1 24 Because the state interest is higher, the commerce
clause will tolerate a greater burden on interstate commerce.
V. STATE CORPORATION LAW: THE "INTERNAL
AFFAIRS" DOCTRINE AND THE NEW OHIO LAW
Before MITE, proponents of state takeover regulation frequently
invoked the so-called "internal affairs" doctrine as a justification for
state regulation. The thrust of the doctrine is that tender offers are
"functionally equivalent to a variety of other methods designed to effect
changes in corporate control, e.g., proxy contests and mergers, which
have traditionally been subject to regulation by the state of incorpora-
tion."1 25 But in MITE, the Supreme Court distinguished tender offers
from other types of changes in corporate control. 2 "Tender offers con-
template transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do not
themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company."127
Mergers and similar fundamental corporate changes, on the other
hand, involve the relationship of all shareholders to the corporation and
to each other. Statutes regulating mergers and similar matters "do not
purport to govern one-on-one transactions between buyers and sellers of
securities."12 8
121. Hostile Tender Offers, supra note 81.
122. Compare Gunter v. AGO Intern., B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (Florida
Insurance Holding Company Act preempted by Williams Act) and National City Lines, Inc. v.
LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (Missouri Insurance Companies Act preempted
by Williams Act), affd on other grounds, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982), with John Alden Life
Insurance Co. v. Woods, [1982] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,617 (D. Ida. Dec. 19, 1981)
(Idaho Acquisition of Control and Insurance Holding Company Systems Act neither preempted
by Williams Act nor invalid under commerce clause).
123. See e.g., Hostile Tender Offers, supra note 81 at 26; Pozen, Making State Takeover
Statutes Safe From Constitutional Attack; Nat'l L.J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 18, col. 4.
124. Pozen, supra note 123, at 18, col. 4.
125. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 501.
126. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 645.
127. Id.




Approximately six months after the Supreme Court decided Edgar
v. MITE Corp., Ohio enacted new takeover legislation seemingly based
upon the internal affairs doctrine.129 The new legislation does not sepa-
rately regulate tender offers, but rather, applies to any "control share
acquisition."130 "[T]he Act eliminates distinctions concerning the
method of acquisition so that it applies not only to the traditional
tender offer but also to open market purchases and privately negotiated
block transactions. '" 13 1
The Ohio Act applies to all Ohio corporations with either a princi-
pal place of business, principal executive office, or substantial assets
within the state, if the corporation has fifty or more shareholders. 3 2
Generally, acquisitions governed by the Ohio Act must be approved by
a vote of the majority of shareholders as well as a majority of disinter-
ested shareholders. 133
Although an extensive analysis of the Ohio Act will not be under-
taken here, the Act is certainly ripe for constitutional challenge. "Thus,
for example, the Act would control the ability of a California resident
to sell a twenty-one percent interest in an Ohio-based company to a
New York resident in a transaction taking place in Florida."" Aside
from possible violation of V-A principles, the extraterritorial impact of
the statute may impermissibly to burden interstate commerce under V-
B analysis.
Although the Supreme Court has held that a sale of stock by a
target shareholder to a bidder does not implicate the internal affairs of
the target company, and thus regulation may not be justified by the
internal affairs doctrine, 18 the tender offer process creates many other
responses which do involve the internal affairs of both the target and
the bidder. For example, hostile tender offers raise fiduciary questions
regarding whether the expenditure is in the best interest of the bidder,
and whether the sale of the target company is in the best interest of
target shareholders. The fiduciary issues involved in hostile corporate
takeovers have become increasingly evident during the mega-tender pe-
129. 1982 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-395, 5-402 (Baldwin). See Kreiden, supra note 129, at 108
n.2. Several other states have enacted new takeover legislation, some of which is based upon
Ohio's approach. See supra note 91.
130. 1982 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-395, (Baldwin) (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(2)(1)
(Baldwin 1982).
131. Kreiden, supra note 129, at 112.
132. 1982 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-395 (Baldwin) (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(y)).
133. Id. (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(E)(1)).
134. Kreiden, supra note 129, at 121.
135. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 645.
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riod of the 1980's. Invariably, bidder management is charged with
wasting corporate assets, just as target management is accused of safe-
guarding its position at the expense of the shareholder.
The states have long been entrusted with the task of regulating
corporate officers and directors. "Presumably, appropriate state take-
over laws could be drafted, in reliance upon the 'internal affairs doc-
trine,' to cover . . the standards applicable to target company direc-
tors in responding to an unsolicited, hostile acquisition offer."13 6 The
state also could consider enacting a standard (more specific than the
"business judgment rule") to judge the reasonableness of a bidder's de-
cision to make a tender offer. Moreover, many corporations adopt pro-
visions in their articles of incorporation or bylaws designed to discour-
age potential bidders or defeat bids once they are made. MITE would
not preclude the state of incorporation from regulating the propriety of
these defensive charter provisions.137 Similarly, the states could regu-
late "golden parachute" proposals, 13 8 as well as the fiduciary duties of
persons who become majority shareholders of a corporation by means
of a tender offer.189 Finally, the state could regulate "the standards and
terms applicable to so-called back-end, or second step, transactions,"'14 0
in addition to "the standards governing appraisal rights in voluntary
freezeouts."' 4'
VI. CONCLUSION
In charting the future course of tender offer regulation, state pol-
icy-makers should first examine the frequency and characteristics of
non-federally regulated tender offers for companies with large percent-
ages of shareholders in their state. The historical number of takeovers
or attempted take-overs in a given state may not be sufficiently high to
warrant further state tender offer legislation. Given a minimum level of
takeover activity, however, it would be in the economic interest of most
states to enact the type of takeover legislation discussed in this article.
State regulation of non-federally regulated tender offers would enhance
shareholder protection. The legislation would ensure that shareholders
136. Hostile Tender Offers, supra note 81, at 24, col. 4, 25, col. 1.
137. Id., at 25, col. 1.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. A merger or similar corporate event following a tender offer, in which the bidder
attempts to cash-out or otherwise eliminate the minority shareholders, is called the back-end or
second step of the transaction.
141. Id.
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would be given sufficient time and information to consider their invest-
ment decision whether to hold, tender or sell into the market. In the
long run, state tender offer regulation of the type described above
would lead to a more efficient and fair securities market in the state.
Enhanced investor protection and increased market efficiency will ulti-
mately facilitate the processes of capital formation and economic
development.

